Conceptualizing the legitimacy of using force by LEVY, Yagil
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SPS 2017/3 
Department of Political and Social Sciences 
 
Conceptualizing the Legitimacy of Using Force 
 
Yagil Levy  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yagil Levy 
 
 
  European University Institute 
Department of Political and Social Sciences 
 
 
 
Conceptualizing the Legitimacy of Using Force 
  
 
Yagil Levy 
 
EUI Working Paper SPS 2017/3 
 
  
 
 
 
This text may be downloaded for personal research purposes only. Any additional reproduction for 
other purposes, whether in hard copy or electronically, requires the consent of the author(s), editor(s). 
If cited or quoted, reference should be made to the full name of the author(s), editor(s), the title, the 
working paper or other series, the year, and the publisher. 
 
ISSN 1725-6755 
 
© Author(s)/editor(s), 2013 
Printed in Italy 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 
I – 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy 
www.eui.eu 
cadmus.eui.eu 
 Abstract 
The question of what constitutes the legitimacy of using force targeting an external adversary, 
has become especially relevant since the wars that followed the 9/11 events and the post-Cold 
War’s interventions in human crises. However, international relations is the main field in 
which this issue is discussed while political scientists tend to mix legitimacy with supportive 
public opinion. This paper is conceptually motivated. It begins by defining the concept of the 
legitimacy of using force. It then analyzes the two components of this legitimacy: the first 
represents the constant, socially constructed component, and the second is a dynamic 
component, on which the paper focuses. It is constituted by several mutually related variables 
which are critical for increasing or decreasing the constant component of this legitimacy and 
can be circumstantially and contextually used by leaders to mobilize support.  
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Introduction 
The question of what constitutes the legitimacy of using force targeting an external adversary, 
has become especially relevant since the wars that followed the 9/11 events (e.g., U.S.’s and 
its allies’ interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan and Israel’s operations against the Gaza Strip), 
and the post-Cold War’s interventions in human crises (e.g., Kosovo). However, international 
relations is the main field in which this issue is discussed, with a focus on the conditions 
under which the international community grants legitimacy to the use of force (see Bjola, 
2009). Less studied is how the use of force is legitimated by the political community whose 
leadership initiates the use of force or shares the burden of doing so with other nations. Here 
we can identify several gaps.  
Scholars mix legitimacy with supportive public opinion (see, for example, Everts, 2001), and 
this perspective creates several problems. First, this perspective ignores the culturally 
ingrained support for or opposition to the use of force. Second, this perspective ignores other 
factors such as global constraints, dissent within the military, and the role of NGOs that affect 
the freedom of policymakers to use force by affecting the legitimacy. Third, this perspective 
focuses overly much on leaders’ attempts to mobilize legitimacy for their policy (see, for 
example, Krebs, 2015), while overlooking the socially constructed political culture and the 
bottom-up mechanism of legitimation springing from society. Fourth, indicators of legitimacy 
other than public opinion are not evaluated, particularly those related to collective action (see 
Gilley, 2006, 505), supporting or opposing the use of force. 
Alternatively, other scholars have focused on the extent to which the political culture is 
imbued with militaristic values (for example, Bacevich, 2005; Mann, 2005). However, this 
perspective leaves little opportunity for exploring how legitimation (or delegitimation) is 
dynamically built within the previously shaped political culture domestically to support or 
oppose the use of force.  
Why does legitimacy for using force matter? To the extent that the modern state, as a 
compulsory jurisdiction, is characterized by its claim and effective capacity to monopolize the 
use of force (Weber, 1964, 156), state-controlled violence is a fundamental component of the 
state and as such is contingent on domestic legitimacy. Historically, legitimacy has even 
become more important inasmuch as the decision to go to war is conditional on the support of 
the local community, those directly shouldering the burden of war. Since the eighteenth 
century, wars could not be waged without popular consent (Handel, 2012, 81-83). The raising 
of the bar for obtaining this consent has grown, inasmuch as Western societies have become 
more averse to sacrifice and more sensitive to normative values, making the challenge of 
legitimation more complicated.  Hence, the importance of conceptualizing the legitimacy of 
using forces. 
This paper is conceptually motivated. It begins by defining the concept of the legitimacy of 
using force. It then analyzes the two components of this legitimacy with a special focus on the 
dynamic component, that is, the variables critical for increasing or decreasing the level of this 
legitimacy. The fourth section highlights the interaction between the dynamic and static 
components of legitimacy and that between the dynamic variables.  
   
The Definition   
Drawing on Burk's (2013, 2-3) "way of war," Johnston's (1996, 222-223) "strategic culture," 
and Mann's (1987) "militarism," the legitimacy of using force relates to the extent to which 
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the state’s formal mode of using armed force against an external adversary is socially 
accepted as a normal, pervasive, and enduring strategic preference. Such legitimacy 
encompasses social beliefs about the role of war in human affairs, the nature of the adversary 
and the threat it poses, and the efficacy of the use of force (Levy, 2016, 79). 
To clarify, the term “use of force” relates to any state-controlled use of violent force against 
an external, not domestic, adversary, even if within the margins of the statist control system 
(such as the West Bank vis-à-vis Israel). That term applies to any violent actions employed 
either by the military or by another state agency (e.g., the CIA-led drone warfare in Pakistan). 
Force can be used either for offensive or defensive goals, such as peace operations in which 
the adversary is the entity interfering with the policing mission of a peace force (e.g., the 
radical Serbs in northern Kosovo).  
This definition encompasses several concepts. First, it is about a state’s action. As Weber 
(1964) argued, “the use of force is regarded as legitimate only so far as it is either permitted 
by the state or prescribed by it” (p. 156). That the use of force is legally initiated by the 
rightful source of authority is generally a precondition for obtaining legitimacy (see Beetham, 
2004, 110), although occasionally, military acts can be regarded as legitimate even if they are 
illegal (see Hurd, 2007).  
Second, the definition is in line with Weber’s (1964) classic perception that legitimacy is not 
a circumstantial view but reflects deeper values. It encompasses normative, legal, traditional 
and cultural values that determine society’s acceptance of regimes and institutions. Social 
action may be oriented by the actors to a belief in the existence of a “legitimate order,” and, as 
Weber (1964, 123) argued, the probability that that action will actually be oriented 
empirically in such a manner testifies to the “validity” of the order. For Weber, the  
orientation to the validity of an order (Ordnung) means more than the mere existence of a uniformity of 
social action determined by custom or self-interest…[but includes] the [actors’] recognition that they 
are binding on the actor or the corresponding action constitutes a desirable model for him to imitate (pp. 
123-124).  
An order is less stable, Weber held, if social action is motivated by motives of pure 
expediency or habits (ibid). Habermas (1992) elaborated on this concept by adding the 
normative grounds. He argued:  
If binding decisions are legitimate, that is, if they can be made independently of the concrete exercise of 
force and of the manifest threat of sanctions, and can be regularly implemented even against the 
interests of those affected, they must be considered as the fulfillment of recognized norms (p. 101).  
Legitimacy, as accordingly defined by Suchman (1995), “is a generalized perception or 
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some 
socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (p. 574). My proposed 
definition of the legitimacy of using force is in alignment with this Weberian approach.  
Therefore, the legitimacy of using force is anchored in the political culture. It is manifested 
(1) in the political discourse and public opinion that support (or oppose) the approach taken 
by policymakers, and (2) their reflection in the intensity of collective action, and (3) the way 
the troops themselves adhere to the mission. All are forms providing evidence of consent (see 
Beetham, 1991, 41). These forms are interrelated: The likelihood of collective antiwar actors’ 
success in mobilizing is largely derived from their ability to gain legitimacy from other 
societal actors (see Marullo & Meyer, 2004, 660-661; Meyer & Minkoff, 2004, 1475). At the 
same time, collective actions may alter public opinion (Marullo & Meyer, 2004, 641), not 
only spring from it. Equally important, dissident activity within the military is not only 
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encouraged by what the soldiers read from the ambient society but also their intra-military 
activity may energize collective actors outside the military, as the cooperation between in-
service resistance and the antiwar movement during the Vietnam War attested (Lembcke, 
1998, 27-48). Such forms of support and objections (and the expectations of them) are what 
policy-makers read and assess before acting. 
How legitimacy can be observed is a theoretical problem of identifying how legitimacy 
explains behavior, independently of how actors explain their attitudes and other motivations 
that drive them to adhere to the order. Identification of this kind is problematic in cases when 
free choice plays a major role in the government’s efforts to regulate citizens’ behavior (for 
example, resistance to desegregation in the U.S.), or when the government aggressively 
coerces behavior (Hyde, 1983, 391-397). Mobilization for using force is in between. 
However, what matters most for empirical and analytical purposes is the policymakers’ 
subjective assessments about the extent to which their policies (or the intention to reshape 
them) are regarded (actually or potentially) as legitimate, as reflected in public opinion and 
political discourse, the profile of collective action, and the troops’ conduct. Such real or false 
assessments affect the policymakers’ freedom of action and motivation to mobilize support.  
Leaders indeed mobilize legitimacy for their policy, but the approach taken here is that 
legitimacy is not necessarily built top-down (as presented, for example, in Krebs, 2015). 
Leaders’ rhetoric and strategies alone do not account for the achievement or loss of legitimacy 
inasmuch as legitimacy is anchored in the political culture. It is the political culture that 
creates the climate that sets the boundaries of legitimate actions and debate (Williams, 2004). 
It follows and third, that legitimacy is not synonymous with public opinion. Public support 
(or lack thereof) reflects socially accepted values. Reservations about polices, moreover, do 
not necessarily undermine legitimacy (see Suchman, 1995, 574). This is especially true, 
because legitimacy reflects embedded values to the degree that citizens behave in a manner 
that is not always consistent with their short-term self-interests (Tyler, 1990, 29).  
Fourth, legitimacy is not synonymous with the justification of specific policies. Justification 
refers to the question of whether the policy is morally sound as distinct from the legitimate 
process that produced it (Miller, 2000, 387). Similarly, and in accordance with the general 
approach described above, “[L]egitimacy, when challenged, bases itself on an appeal to the 
past, while justification relates to an end that lies in the future” (Arendt, 1972, 151). 
Fifth, legitimacy is also not synonymous with trust. Citizens trust their government “to the 
extent they believe that it will act in their interests, that its procedures are fair, and that their 
trust of the state and of others is reciprocated” (Levi, 1998, 88), in the sense that citizens “can 
articulate a return for their compliance and, second, they feel they are being treated with 
respect” (ibid, 93) and other citizens also do their part (pp. 88-89).  It follows that trust can be 
regarded as a component of legitimacy, the absence of which may create a “legitimacy 
deficit” in situations where the government is chronically unable to meet what the citizens 
believe are its basic responsibilities (Beetham, 2004, 110). In the case of using force, the 
citizens first of all believe in the principle of using force and then trust the government to 
implement this principle in a trustworthy manner.  
Sixth, legitimacy is not meant to be a normative judgment. It rests “on a belief in the ‘legality’ 
of patterns of normative rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to 
issue commands (legal authority)” (Weber, 1964, 328). This empirical or descriptive approach 
asks how beliefs about legitimacy influence decision-making rather than examining 
legitimacy in normative terms, according to which    
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[a]n entity has political legitimacy if and only if it is morally justified in exercising political power, 
where the exercise of political power may, in turn, be defined as the (credible) attempt to achieve 
supremacy in the making, application, and enforcement of laws within a jurisdiction. It is argued that an 
entity that exercises political power is morally justified in doing so only if it meets a minimal standard 
of justice, understood as the protection of basic human rights (Buchanan, 2004, 145).  
In other words, it is the distinction between a subjective approach, which investigates whether 
the citizens believe that the authority is acting in a legitimate manner, and an objective 
approach, which examines the extent to which the authority has established the minimum 
moral requirements for its rule regardless of the citizens’ beliefs (Hurd, 2007). I prefer the 
subjective, empirical approach to the normative one inasmuch as the main goal of 
conceptualizing the legitimacy of using force is to explain policies – how society is mobilized 
for war – rather than to assess them normatively.  
Sixth, the focus is not on the rules, institutions, or leadership in general, but on specific 
policies. This approach is in line with other research such as the study of Sunshine and Tyler 
(2003) of how the police’s decision-making gains legitimacy, allowing it to exercise its 
authority.   
Moving from the general features of legitimacy to the process of legitimation, Suchman’s 
types of legitimacy are helpful in bypassing one of the problems in Weber’s theory about the 
factors beyond custom or self-interest that motivate social action (Hyde, 1983). Accordingly, 
the legitimacy of using force is both a type of exchange legitimacy and cognitive legitimacy. It 
is a type of exchange legitimacy (Suchman, 1995, 578), by resting on the self-interested 
calculations of the citizenry, from which leaders draw their legitimacy to use force and 
prepare for that eventuality. Citizens support military policies in exchange for security 
provided by the state, or at least the expectation of it. As part of this exchange, citizens 
scrutinize the policies enacted and their benefits (ibid), thereby creating a form of civilian 
control over the military. Interests, however, are not simply the agents’ preferences but 
defined as those “norms, values, and purposes implicit in the practice of social life and 
associated with social roles as principles of action” (Isaac, 1987, 26). Citizens’ interests in the 
promotion of security are socially constructed.  
At the same time, and therefore, the legitimacy of using force may also be a type of cognitive 
legitimacy that regards the use of force as inevitable and is based on taken-for-granted cultural 
values, where cognition rather than interests or evaluations play the pivotal role (Suchman, 
1995, 582). Such a situation signifies militarization, whereby the use of force is instilled in the 
citizens’ mindset as the normal and even preferred mode of action (see Mann, 1987). It is 
decoupled, at least temporally, from the citizens’ expectations about the utility of using force 
relative to less belligerent options.  
In democracies, the elected civilians’ use of force is subject (or should be subject) to a 
deliberative process that addresses the legitimacy of using force. During these deliberations, 
the camps favoring and opposing the use of force may debate values and norms as well as 
policies.  
A deliberative democracy is rooted in the principle that citizens are committed to “the 
resolution of problems of collective choice through public reasoning, and regard their basic 
institutions as legitimate in so far as they establish the framework for free public deliberation” 
(Cohen, 2003, 345-346). The public sphere is the most important location for the contestation 
of discourses (Dryzek, 2001). In the military realm, deliberation is based on broad based 
debates about military policies (Dauber, 1998), the slow thoughtfulness with which the 
debates are conducted (Huysmans, 2004), openness in discussing the issues (Krebs & Lobasz, 
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2007), available information (Kaufmann, 2004), equality among the participants (Dryzek, 
2001) and their interest in using argumentative reasoning for reaching an understanding on 
the issues (Bjola, 2008, 639), and the participants’ ability to mobilize to overcome entrenched 
interests (Schmidt, 2010, 17-18).  
When deliberation is limited, the popular will may stagnate, and the military's autonomy and 
that of its political supervisors to interpret this will may increase (see Kohn, 1997).  
Therefore, the legitimacy of using force can arise from active deliberation or the stagnation of 
deliberation through which the use of force is socially, but passively, accepted (Levy, 2016). 
It is the public sphere where the deliberations between policymakers, collective actors and 
NGOs, intellectuals and journalists take place.  
A high level of legitimacy of using force leads to an offensive approach, meaning a strategy 
aimed at disarming an adversary (Posen, 1984, 14). In contrast, a low level of legitimacy of 
using force encourages a defensive approach, aimed at denying the adversary its goal (ibid), 
that is, doing just what is necessary to repel an external attack. Distinguishing between 
'militant' and 'pacifist' democracies provides a similar categorization (Müller, 2004). 
Nevertheless, in recognition of the new type of wars that often fought in urban areas, 
including humanitarian interventions, the legitimacy of using force is also focused on using 
weapons that might harm enemy noncombatants; the use of force may be perfectly legitimate 
in a given case but not to attack noncombatants. Thus, in this context, a high level of 
legitimacy of using force leads to fire policies that expose enemy noncombatants to a high 
level of risk, either intentionally or with minimum restrictions on harming them.  
 
The Components of Legitimacy 
The legitimacy of using force has two components. The first represents the constant, socially 
constructed component of the legitimacy. Nevertheless, this component is not completely 
static but changes more slowly and therefore reflects variations over time. In addition, and 
more importantly for the focus of this paper, there is a dynamic component as well. 
Beginning with the constant component, it is beyond the scope of this paper to provide 
explanations about how the legitimacy of using force is shaped. Students of militarism (e.g., 
Bacevich, 2005; Mann, 1987; 2005) have already provided well-established explanations for 
the shaping of this legitimacy.  
The fundamentals of this legitimacy have been historically transformed through the rise and 
fall of the level of militarization and demilitarization. For example, while war was considered 
legitimate for protecting religious fate in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, since the 
Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, it has become a legitimate tool for promoting the state’s power. 
Since World War II, normative beliefs about war have begun to play a more important role 
(Bjola, 2009, 451-459). 
Important is the role of the development of a country’s historical heritage in affecting the 
legitimacy of using force. In Britain, the imperial heritage played a pivotal role in shaping the 
state’s commitment to playing an international role and engaging in smaller scale operations 
away from the home territory. In contrast, for Sweden, the imperial heritage promoted its 
neutrality and focused its resources on home defense against the Soviet/Russian threat. 
Following the attacks of 9/11, different heritages yielded different approaches to the use of 
force (Berndtsson et al., 2015).  
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In the Netherlands, Dutch memories of the sacrifices and violence involved in the Indonesian 
war in 1945-1949 (including atrocities committed by Dutch troops) informed the debate about 
the Netherlands’ engagement in Afghanistan (Van der Meulen & Soeters, 2005). Likewise, in 
Israel, the memory of the Holocaust guides the nation’s reactions to external threats. Such 
threats are sometimes regarded as a potential second Holocaust and hence justify military 
aggressiveness (Lustick, 2008). In the U.S., it is precisely the liberal tradition that legitimizes 
aggressiveness against those enemies identified as non-liberal (Desch, 2010).  
Military failures can reshape the nation’s heritage, leading to demilitarization. Military 
failures may prompt a regime transformation, sometimes encouraged by external coercion, 
given that the responsibility for defeat is almost always attributed to the political and military 
elites who presided over it (Dogan & Higley, 1998, 8-9). To the extent that regime 
transformations inevitably entail more civilian control aimed at limiting the misuse of the 
military to intervene in domestic politics (Peters & Wagner, 2011, 180), demilitarization is 
further enhanced. For example, the political culture in Italy is largely affected by the postwar 
period of the late 1940s, when the radical break with the Fascist past gave rise to strong 
societal beliefs rejecting war and militarism and marginalizing the military from civilian 
policy-making. In contrast, in France, similar sentiments have not emerged (Ruffa, 2016).  
In sum, this more stable component represents what Bjola (2009, 604-610) termed “the 
constitutive effect” of legitimacy, defining the cultural and social conditions for the use of 
force.  
The legitimacy of using force has been a challenge since Vietnam. Wars of choice, the kind of 
non-existential wars fought by the West since World War II (even if originally initiated as 
wars of necessity), in which direct threats to immediate national interests are not involved, 
leave sufficient scope for internal debates about their success, alternatives, risks and costs 
(Smith Hugh, 2005).  Furthermore, with the empowerment of the market society, a post-
heroic mentality emerged, resting upon a capitalist vision of the economy with the peaceful 
spirit of commerce at its center (Münkler, 2005, 71-72).  
Nevertheless, as can be inferred from multiple studies, several mutually related variables are 
critical for increasing or decreasing the constant, socially constructed level of this legitimacy 
and can be circumstantially and contextually used by leaders to mobilize support. All of these 
variables constitute the dynamic component of the legitimacy of using force.  
 
Variables Affecting the Legitimacy of Using Force 
The variables involved in the legitimacy of using force can be grouped into three categories 
(with mixtures among them): 1) legal and policy variables, 2) cultural and discursive variables 
and 3) structural variables. Each of these variables functions in a different domain. The legal 
and policy variables create the infrastructure to which the cultural and discursive and 
structural layers are added.  
Legal and Policy Variables 
1. Legalizing the use of force. As noted previously, obtaining the legitimacy to use force is 
usually preconditioned on the rightful source of authority initiating that action legally 
(Beetham, 2004, 110). Therefore, exhausting the legal tools for building legitimacy may be 
the leaders’ initial step, inasmuch as the issue is often who has the authority to use force.  In 
many parliamentary democracies, constitutional provisions have introduced tight controls on 
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the government by giving the parliament veto power over military deployments (Peters & 
Wagner, 2011,180, 185-186).  The War Powers Act that restricted the U.S. President's 
freedom to commit troops to combat zones (Carter, 1984) is another example. Furthermore, 
legalization is instrumental not only in the initiation stage but also in the management phase. 
One example is when issues of legality and accountability were raised regarding the U.S.-led 
drone warfare in Pakistan during the presidency of Barack Obama (Crawford, 2013, xiii-xv). 
Nonetheless, given that military acts can be regarded as legitimate even if they are illegal (see 
Hurd, 2007), legality is usually necessary but certainly not sufficient for legitimizing the use 
of force. Other mechanisms may play a role as well. 
2. Coping with domestic liberal constraints. Domestic constraints are derived from the 
democratic imperatives demanding respect for noncombatant immunity along with the 
commitment to tolerance and nonviolence (Valentino et al., 2004, 382-3). A sharp distinction 
is made between the ethics that governed warfare during World War II, when the norms 
allowed the bombing of civilians, and the new imperatives that make the intended killing of 
noncombatants forbidden (Zehfuss, 2011, 545-546). The Vietnam War marked the decline in 
the support of the American public for targeting enemy noncombatants (Valentino, 2016). 
Therefore citizens are expected to pressure their governments to uphold those values 
(Valentino et al., 2004, 383). Democracies then face protests by NGOs against the 
disproportional use of force that causes unnecessary suffering and violates the principles of 
international humanitarian law (IHL). Such pressures run counter to the military emphasis on 
fighting wars with controversial weapons such as flame or cluster munitions (Hills, 2004, 
230-237). This situation creates “adverse global media coverage” of military deployments 
(Shaw, 2002, 355). 
Democratic imperatives are backed by the impact of global restraints, including IHL, whose 
enhanced accountability mechanisms subject governmental bodies to public scrutiny (Watkin, 
2004). Governments are also subject to global surveillance by global institutional networks 
that include not only international legal bodies but also the global media and NGOs to which 
local public is attuned (Shaw, 2005, 60-61, 75-76). “In the increasingly litigious societies of 
the West, no government can ignore the danger that international law could be applied against 
it,” maintained Shaw (p. 75). However, from the perspective proposed in this paper, most 
relevant is how the public, NGOs, social movements and other actors internalize those global 
constraints and translate them into public opinion and collective action.   
Consequently, the threshold for using force is increased, and self-defense becomes the critical 
criterion legitimating the initiation of the use of force (jus ad bellum).  In tandem, human 
rights plays a growing role by providing the justification for using force to protect people 
from their own governments (Douzinas, 2003), and to promote democracy and civil rights 
(Hills, 2004). Nevertheless, the challenge of legitimacy is still there. It is centered around the 
tension between the principle of the sovereignty of the targeted state and the moral 
responsibility of the international community to protect the local population from suffering 
serious harm as a result of the state’s action or inability to protect its people (see International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001). Another criticism revolves around 
the argument that what is called “the liberal way of war” has become “crusades with only one 
of two outcomes: endless war or the transformation of other societies and cultures into liberal 
societies and cultures” (Dillon & Reid, 2009, 5). At the same time, critics argue that by being 
committed to the formal rules of IHL, Western states fail to secure human rights in war, 
because the “international humanitarian law serves, at least in part, to protect and regulate the 
taking of life” (Barnidge, 2013, 7). Taking a more practical perspective, Jennifer Welsh 
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(2004, 76-84) summed up the controversial issues around the potentially negative 
consequences of humanitarian interventions. Among them are the creation of unrealistic 
expectations by the oppressed peoples, the potential for long-term occupation by the 
intervening nations, and the real capacity to address humanitarian crises relative to the 
potential to divide international institutions and affect their credibility. 
To enhance legitimacy, the U.S., as the main initiator of military interventions, seeks to 
secure approval from the United Nations and NATO. At the same time, the debates that 
military human interventions sparked, especially in the Kosovo case of 1999, brought about 
an international effort to determine the criteria for military intervention under the title of “The 
Responsibility to Protect” (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 
2001). The United Nations World Summit of 2005 institutionalized the principles.  
Once force is used (jus in bello), the just war theory, which is deeply anchored in the liberal 
tradition, requires that the immunity of noncombatants be extended from the prohibition to 
intentionally harm civilians to the requirement that “[c]ivilians have a right to something 
more. And if saving civilian lives means risking soldiers' lives, the risk must be accepted” 
(Walzer, 2015, 156).  
With increasing tensions between military practices and these and other principles derived 
from IHL, “lawfare” became paramount. “Lawfare,” as Dunlap (2008) defined it, is “the 
strategy of using – or misusing – law as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve 
an operational objective” (p. 146). It became a legal mechanism to morally legitimize the 
manner in which force is used and harms civilians. In the U.S., the growing presence of 
military judge advocates who have controversially become an integral part of a commander’s 
warfighting team and provide advice on the tactical level supports this effort (Dunlap, 2008).   
In the wake of these legal imperatives, another option for legitimizing the use of force that 
may harm civilians is using the argument that the just war theory and the requirements of IHL 
cannot considered valid because of the gray areas involved in the new type of war. For 
example, Dunlap (1999, 19) proposed modifying the current understanding of absolute 
noncombatant immunity in situations where democracies fighting adversaries engaging in 
unlawful acts (for example, the wrongful use of a weapon of mass destruction). In this case, 
civilians bear responsibility for failing to restrain their leadership. It has also been argued that 
international law does not require risking combatants to reduce the risk to enemy 
noncombatants. The security of the attacking forces is viewed as part of the military goals of 
the army, while imposing risks on its own soldiers to protect noncombatants means using 
them as a tool for the benefit of others (Benvenisti, 2006).  
Cultural-Discursive Variables 
3. Leveraging an external threat. To legitimize the mobilization for war, leaders leverage 
and sometimes even exaggerate the level of the external threat to demand public consent for 
mobilizing the monetary and human resources needed to thwart this threat (Lake, 1992).  The 
discursive process constructs the threat as jeopardizing vital interests (Everts, 2002) vis-à-vis 
the perceived availability of nonlethal options to eliminate it. For Tilly (1985), the state 
functions as a “protection racket,” meaning, it sells security in exchange for extracting 
resources through which statemaking takes place. Selling protection means that the state must 
“simulate, stimulate, or even fabricate threats of external war” (p. 171). Framing the threat in 
more apocalyptic and less instrumental terms has even become since World War II “the most 
effective at generating and legitimating massive society-wide sacrifice and are today the only 
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narrative form that can sustain war as culturally acceptable” (Smith Philip, 2005, 27). In short, 
militarization takes place.  
Militarization involves socialization that extends to the educational system and other domains 
of civil culture and economy by the “merging of a warlike mentality and neoliberal modes of 
discipline and education… [and then] it becomes difficult to reclaim the language of 
conscience, social responsibility, and civic engagement", as Henry Giroux (2014, 495-497) 
diagnosed the post-9/11 period.  
Proponents of securitization have clearly recognized an important dimension of this process 
with its extension to non-military domains (Buzan et al., 1995), identifying a problem as a 
security threat and matching the use of extraordinary measures to deal with it. Securitization 
can be a form of modern, civilian militarization. Securitization frames the threat as an urgent 
national security issue. Therefore, it cannot be subjected to the normal haggling of politics. In 
contrast, desecuritization entails a deliberative process in which the threat is contested. This 
process also involves a better understanding of the political dynamics of successful 
securitization in an attempt to influence its course (Salter, 2008), and challenges the 
institutional authority and power relations establishing securitization as a "true" discourse 
(Aradau, 2004). 
If mobilization fails to counter skeptical sentiments in the era of wars of choice (skepticism 
that is largely affected by the aversion to sacrifice) the Weinberger and Powell doctrines that 
American policymakers drafted in the 1980s and 1990s respectively suggest that the 
assessment of the level of threat may lead to the selection of missions. Therefore, the use of 
force is restricted to situations in which an overwhelming reaction is legitimated as a last 
resort to remove a substantial threat. Democratic leaders require greater confidence than non-
democratic leaders about their prospects of victory to go to war, making them very selective 
in their use of force (De Mesquita et al., 2004).   
At the same time, the belief in using force to remove a threat should be associated with the 
belief that the goal is actually attainable. Policymakers can make efforts to convince the 
public that this belief is accurate (Dauber, 1998). In terms of legitimacy, moreover, a 
“legitimacy deficit” is created with a significant decline in the people’s trust in the 
government’s ability to use the armed forces for providing security. Thus, trust building 
measures such as improving the military’s capabilities may also increase the legitimacy to use 
the troops.      
4. Dehumanization of the enemy. Dehumanization adds a cultural and symbolic layer to the 
inflating of risks. Military killing necessitates overcoming ingrained, deeply held social 
values respecting human life. To this end, states have to portray their enemies as monsters and 
animals to whom human moral principles are inapplicable (Malesevic, 2010, 142). It is little 
wonder that this phenomenon arose in the twentieth century to justify using force (Van Belle 
2000, 78–80). Dehumanization of the enemy increases when the combatant is distanced from 
the battlefield (Collins, 2008, 1702-1707; Malesevic, 2010, 47-48).  
Together with the challenge to legitimize the use of force and overcome the reluctance to 
sacrifice, new patterns of dehumanization developed along with the development of weaponry 
that distanced the troops from the theater of war. Not only are enemy civilians placed on the 
lowest rung of the human hierarchy, but, as Judith Butler (2004) asserted, they are also denied 
the right to life by not being considered human. She introduced the hierarchy of grief, the 
distinction between those whose lives are considered valuable and mourned (Western lives), 
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and those who are considered ungrievable for the loss of their lives, such as enemy civilians 
in Iraq and Afghanistan, because they, apparently, have never lived (Butler, 2009).  
Dehumanization plays a new role here. As Butler argued (2004):  
Dehumanization's relation to discourse is complex. It would be too simple to claim that violence simply 
implements what is already happening in discourse, such that a discourse on dehumanization produces 
treatment, including torture and murder, structured by the discourse. Here the dehumanization 
emerges at the limits of discursive life, limits established through prohibition and foreclosure. There is 
less a dehumanizing discourse at work here than a refusal of discourse that produces dehumanization as 
a result. Violence against those who are already not quite living, that is, living in a state of suspension 
between life and death (p. 36).  
Achille (2003) takes a similar approach in his concept of necropolitics, according to which: 
[W]eapons are deployed in the interest of maximum destruction of persons and the creation of death-
worlds, new and unique forms of social existence in which vast populations are subjected to conditions 
of life conferring upon them the status of living dead (p. 40). 
To some extent, the emerging post-Cold War moral world order is justified by this hierarchy 
of distinctions between human groups. However, in turn, it also legitimates this order. The 
new legal norms ingrained in the new order legitimate the use of force as justified to protect 
human rights and take action against those resisting the new order (for example, the Serbs in 
the case of the Kosovo War of 1999). The use of force takes the form of a police operation 
that considers the resisters criminals rather than political opponents. As such, they are subject 
to suppression and punishment (Douzinas, 2003, see also Zehfuss, 2012). 
Religion adds a complementary layer to dehumanization by portraying wars as religious wars. 
Indeed, the new global security discourse actually signifies a postmodern return to religious 
wars (Bigo, 2012, 209). Religion may help redefine what constitutes a threat (Hassner, 2014, 
5), and thus paint the war as a more crucial endeavor. In doing so, it helps demonize the 
enemy, making them easier to kill (Johnson & Reeve, 2013, 75), and is thus instrumental to 
justifying the use of force. It even “smashes the cost-benefit logic that can lead to 
capitulation…  In such cases, it is no longer about winning… [i]t is not about costs—being 
killed in battle is not death but martyrdom. Neither is it about benefits—rewards become 
supernatural rather than material” (ibid, 2013, 76).   
5. Using mechanisms to relax the state’s responsibility. This is a mixture of the legal and 
policy variables and the cultural and discursive ones.  
With the restraining impacts of liberal values and global monitoring, states seek ways to use 
force but in a manner that also relaxes their responsibility for the consequences entailed. 
James Ron (2003) introduced the distinction between “ghetto” and “frontier” to explain 
variations in the methods states use to repress unwanted populations.  Ghettos are 
“repositories of unwanted and marginalized populations, but are nonetheless included within 
the dominant state's legal sphere of influence, classifying them as quasi-members of the 
polity” (p. 43), while frontiers are “peripheral regions unincorporated into a powerful state's 
legal zone of influence” (pp. 41-42). According to this distinction, the Palestinian population 
in the West Bank and Gaza during the 1970s and 1980s is considered a ghetto vis-à-vis Israel, 
while Bosnia became a frontier vis-à-vis Serbia since 1992. As Ron suggests, different levels 
of control also yield different levels of the state’s responsibility for the population, tempered 
by sensitivity to global monitoring. Thus, the ghetto population is policed, while the 
population in the frontier is more prone to acts of lawless nationalist violence. 
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It follows that states can increase the legitimacy of using force against a perceived hostile 
population by reducing its responsibility for that population. The re-architecturing of the 
state’s borders, as the case of Israel vis-à-vis the Palestinians since the 1990s, is a case in 
point. With Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza in 2005, Gaza effectively reverted from its status 
as a “ghetto” under Israeli control to that of a “frontier” on the edges of the state but not under 
its control. Therefore, Israel’s responsibility for the civilian population diminished, at least 
according to its perception and that of its allies, and it could justify forceful responses 
whenever Hamas and other local militias shelled Israeli civilians (Levy, 2012, 162).  
However, while this is a more policy-centered variable, states also have discursive 
mechanisms at their disposal for relaxing their responsibility.  One of these mechanisms is the 
tactic of “accidents.”  For example, the unintentional, though predictable and preventable, 
killing of enemy noncombatants by American troops – such as the bombing of a convoy of 
Albanian refugees in southeast Kosovo (April 1999) and the carpet bombing of a village near 
Khanabad in Afghanistan (November 2001) – were labeled “accidents.” This labeling 
normalized and hence also legitimized these killings as “unfortunate events for which liberal 
states cannot properly be held to account” (Owens, 2003a, 600), making the killing of 
civilians more permissible. This is especially true, because the West uses the death-free 
objective of “humanitarian” combat in which state-of-the-art weapons are deployed and 
portrayed as human (ibid, 600-606). Presenting events as accidents has even been extended to 
instances when allied groups committed massacres against the local population in areas under 
the control of the U.S. or Britain. The unintended, but again, predictable, killing of enemy 
civilians were presented as accidental (Shaw, 2005, 84-86). Depicting such killing as 
accidental relaxes the responsibility of the Western armies controlling the areas of conflict.  
Another mechanism the state uses is to reduce the reported number of civilian casualties. The 
media play an important role here by highlighting incidents related to high-tech weaponry and 
underestimating other causes of civilian deaths and injuries such as landmines and 
unexploded ordnance strikes. Thus, the real costs of war in the form of the indirect effects of 
munitions are blurred (Benini & Moulton, 2004; Shaw, 2005, 88-89, 93-94). Smaller numbers 
also reduce the state’s responsibility.  
Against this background we can understand differences in the number of noncombatant 
fatalities reported by different agencies (governments and NGOs).  Discrepancies in such 
reports are a typical issue when it comes to battles between Western and non-Western rivals 
that have political implications (see, for example, Crawford, 2013, 136-142). Such differences 
may mirror different perspectives about the applicability of international law and the 
distinction it makes between combatants and noncombatants, namely, who can be considered 
a noncombatant. However, their very existence reflects the proclivity of governments to 
reduce the numbers and, by implication, their responsibility as well. For example, to counter 
criticism against the collateral killing caused by drones, in 2012 the U.S. changed the method 
of counting civilian casualties by considering all military age males in a strike zone as 
combatants (Walzer, 2016, 16). 
6. Legitimation by technology. Western states rely on the use of precision weapons to 
sustain their legitimacy, argued Shaw (2005, 84). Zehfuss (2011, 543-545) maintained that 
smart bombs and precision-guided munitions, especially with their visualization in the Gulf 
War (1991), enjoy a positive reputation as helping Western militaries significantly reduce the 
number of unintended noncombatant casualties. This depiction makes the war seem ethical, 
legitimate and even humanitarian (Owens, 2003a), inasmuch as the idea that legitimate 
warfare must avoid large numbers of civilian casualties has increasingly become the global 
Conceptualizing the Legitimacy of Using Force 
 
12 
norm (see also Reisman, 1997). Furthermore, it is precisely this promise of precision that 
relaxes the accountability for accidents. Against this backdrop we can understand the 
confidence of the U.S. public that their armed forces make an effective effort to avoid 
casualties among enemy civilians (Larson & Savych, 2006, xx).  
7. Casualty sensitivity. Casualty sensitivity can be leveraged to reduce domestic sensitivity 
to the immunity of enemy civilians, especially when the public’s greatest concern is about 
military casualties, and civilian casualties are a secondary issue (see Larson & Savych, 2006, 
169-170 on the case of the U.S. public in Iraq). Even ethical justifications for relaxing such 
constraints appeared, arguing that the duty to protect one’s own soldiers may relax the duty to 
spare enemy noncombatants (Kasher & Yadlin, 2005, 17-18), and, by implication, to increase 
the legitimacy of using force. With increasing casualty sensitivity and a decline in the 
sensitivity to enemy civilians, militaries enjoy more freedom to transfer the risk from their 
own combatants to enemy noncombatants by increasing the use of excessive lethality (Shaw, 
2005).       
Structural Variables  
In general, structural variables are more consequential than intentional in the sense that 
intentional policies may have unintended, although desirable, consequences that change 
power relations.  
8. Structural weakening of deliberation. The domestic political structure affects public 
opinion and elite opinion, and hence shapes and constrains foreign policy-making. As Aldrich 
et al. (2006) note, from the perspective of international relations and political science, the 
public (in the U.S.) acts as a constraint on elites who would otherwise be more willing to use 
force. From a sociological perspective, by reforming politics, rulers can mobilize support for 
war. For example, mass mobilization for World War I rested largely on making war “citizen 
militarism” by increasing the political representation of the workers and peasants. The 
mobilization for war, the allocation of rights – in the sense that the citizenry controls its own 
destiny – and aggressive and militarist nationalism were all tied together in the latter part of 
the nineteenth century (Mann, 1987, 39-42). 
Conversely, with growing challenges to legitimize the use of force, and with the transition to 
a volunteer, technology-intensive military during the post-Cold War era, which reduced the 
level of mobilization for war, governments could reduce the high political threshold for 
initiating wars (Starr, 2010, 65). They could simply bypass the popular will (Vennesson, 
2011) and hence weaken deliberation. As Malešević (2008) explained, following Martin 
Shaw and others: “The militarism of new wars does not require direct popular mobilization, 
rather it aims to indirectly acquire passive support by relying on media as a neutralizer of 
electoral surveillance” (p. 102). “Technological mastery removed death from our experience 
of war. But war without death –to our side – is war that ceases to be fully real to us: virtual 
war," argued Ignatieff (2000, 5), concerning the declining interest of public opinion in the 
cost-free and bloodless use of force.  
Consequently, the mode of citizenship has been gradually changed with the reduction of 
participation in war. As Mann (1987, 47-50) famously asserted, the new type of citizenship is 
that of “spectator,” a citizen who is well-informed about how his or her country manages its 
military affairs but without direct participation in trying to affect policies.  The citizens’ 
interest in warfare is no different from the way they take part in the Olympic games: 
knowledge and emotional involvement but without the commitment of personal resources. 
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Following this metaphor, a few years before the new Western deployments in Iraq, 
Afghanistan and Gaza, Hooks (1999, 495) predicted that:  
It is far more likely that citizens will cheer on technological marvels as they kill thousands of people 
and destroy cities and less likely that the citizenry will empathize with the suffering caused by this 
highly scientific and distant form of slaughter (p. 495).  
Instrumental to this end is not only the numbers that the military recruits and their distance 
from the theater of war, but also the impact of recruitment policies on power relations. 
Conscription touches more powerful actors more directly than voluntary service. Thus, 
citizens and groups with political power who could most effectively serve as a critical mass 
would be much more politically engaged under conscription because of the vulnerability of 
their members to compulsory service. This is especially so, because "conscription requires 
service from the willing and unwilling alike, while a volunteer force does not” (Vasquez, 
2009, 87-88). Such a situation increases the potential for the presence of a large number of 
conscripts who might dissent when the legitimacy of using force is questionable and mobilize 
their social networks for this end, as the cases of Vietnam or Israel’s first Lebanon War 
(1982-1985) attest.  
Conversely, in a vocationalized, volunteer army, free choice plays a major role in the decision 
to join the ranks. Typically, the service is more likely to attract those who support the mission 
ideologically, an impact of the self-selection mechanism of a volunteer force (Bachman, 
Sigelman & Diamond, 1978).  In addition, volunteer forces draw more on lower-class groups 
than conscript militaries do, as they offer those groups, whose options in the labor market are 
fewer than those of upper-class groups, social recognition along with expectations for upward 
mobility and monetary rewards (Levy, 2013). Hence, they and their social networks conform 
submissively to the military’s imperatives. Opting out from the beginning is the preferred 
option of those resisting military service or the policies it serves, while for those who have 
enlisted, the fear of losing the jobs encourages conformity (Cortright, 2010, 506). In general, 
conformity is not only a matter of ideological and material preferences but also of the lack of 
resources to act collectively (see Morris & Staggenborg, 2004, 179).  
Thus, when voluntarism governs and powerful groups have little motivation to seek 
information and openly challenge policies because they are less touched by the service, 
deliberation about war is limited. The use of force may encounter less resistance (Levy, 
2016). Then, the legitimacy of using force arises not from active deliberation but from the 
stagnation of deliberation, a kind of passive legitimation. Given that a volunteer force 
increases the leaders’ autonomy to deploy troops by increasing the legitimacy of using force, 
leaders can actively increase their autonomy by modifying the recruitment model (see more 
below). 
Elite consensus poses another structural impediment to deliberation. International institutions 
such as NATO constrain elite consensus inasmuch as elites are sensitive to the costs of 
international defection and therefore unite around their nation’s commitment to international 
cooperation (Kreps, 2010). As John Zaller (1994) argued, when elites are united in support of 
a particular policy in the sense that they do not stress alternative policies, politically aware 
Americans are more likely than other parts of society to support the policy because of their 
greater exposure to political information. According to this argument, leaders play a key role 
in interpreting wartime events for the public. Citizens determine their opinions by listening to 
trusted politicians who share their political predispositions (Berinsky, 2007). However, even 
if elite consensus does not have a top–down impact on public opinion, leaders can give less 
weight to public opinion because they can be less concerned about electoral costs (Kreps, 
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2010).  Under similar conditions, moreover, even if elite consensus cannot always maintain 
strong and stable public support for war, elites can still retain more influence over some 
dimensions of wartime opinion. One example is the decoupling of deployment from support 
for the war, as the case of British elites and public opinion about the Afghan War suggests 
(Kriner & Wilson, 2016). 
Furthermore, the media may reinforce, rather than balance out, this weakness of deliberation. 
With the flood of information since the 1970, a consequence of a multi-channel 
communications system and market-oriented competition between information brokers, 
deliberation was further reduced. As Christopher Lasch (1995) noted,  
What democracy requires is public debate, not information… Information, usually seen as the 
precondition of debate, is better understood as its by-product….Otherwise we take in information 
passively—if we take it in at all… From these considerations it follows that the job of the press is to 
encourage debate, not to supply the public with information. .. It is no secret that the public knows less 
about public affairs than it used to know (p. 81).  
As Lasch implied, with the help of the media, the citizens of democracies know more than 
ever before about their armed forces but can do less with the information. Kohn (2002) noted 
this inverse relationship between increased access to information and less civilian control over 
the military, claiming:  
Issues of civilian control seem to escape the press; time after time, events or issues that in past years 
would have been framed or interpreted as touching upon civilian control now go unnoticed and 
unreported, at least in those terms (p. 12).    
9. Changing the political orientation of the ranks. As noted earlier, conscription is 
more likely than a volunteer force to provoke challenges to the legitimacy of using force 
because of the power, resources and motivations of the social networks involved. As part of 
this, the ranks themselves play an important role.  
Ruffa et al. (2013) argued that due to the increasing role of the tactical level in peacekeeping 
operations and the new interventionist wars, soldiers have more options to affect domestic 
politics, either intentionally or unintentionally. Misbehaving, or making tactical or operational 
decisions that have political consequences or may affect the functioning of the military are 
among the options soldiers can choose. Furthermore, soldiers, motivated by prior ideological 
agendas, can intentionally attempt to affect policies, creating mechanisms of “control from 
within.”  Such control is defined as the intentional actions taken by soldiers when tasked with 
implementing politically sensitive missions with which they disagree in an attempt to affect 
the political performance of the military, either directly or through civilian state agencies. 
Among the forms of control from within are restraining the aggressiveness of other soldiers, 
whistle blowing, selective and gray refusal to deploy, foot-dragging, collective bargaining 
about deployments, and documentation and testimonies. In a conscript military there are 
better conditions for the development of such forms of control, with effects in real time, than 
in a volunteer force (Levy, 2017), 
Control from within matters, because it contributes to the deliberative process through which 
the legitimacy of using force is shaped. Given that new wars do not require direct popular 
mobilization, allowing leaders to bypass the citizenry, civilian control, in its wider sense, 
should counter public passivity in order to activate the popular will. As the Vietnam War 
demonstrated, dissidence emerging from the ranks may be instrumental in such activation.  
As part of the transition from a conscripted to a volunteer army, moreover, the 
technologization of the militaries took place. The mode of armament determines the level of 
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detachment of the combatant from the victim, helping bypass the almost universal aversion to 
close-encounter killings (Malesevic, 2010, 227-229). By reducing the likelihood of resistance 
springing from the ranks, the legitimacy of using force is not only bolstered but also increases 
further.  As Randall Collins argued (2008):  
The farther from the front, the more rhetorical ferociousness is expressed, and rhetorical enthusiasm for 
the whole fighting enterprise… The proportion of empty rhetoric expands with each step toward the 
rear; war is successively more idealized, the enemy successively more dehumanized, attitudes toward 
killing successively more callous, and the whole affair more like the cheering of sports fans (pp. 1702-
1707). 
It follows that the transition from conscript to volunteer forces increases the leaders’ 
autonomy to deploy troops by increasing the legitimacy of using force. Acknowledging this 
logic, leaders actively increased their autonomy by reforming the model of recruitment (and 
surely, they were motivated by other factors as well). In the first stage, there was a transition 
from conscript to volunteer forces in most industrialized democracies, which helped demolish 
the historical citizen-soldier model and hence also defused conscientious objection (Ajangiz, 
2002). Here we see how the political architecturing of the ranks as part of the transition to 
volunteer forces adds another layer to the positive impact of the abolition of the draft to 
reducing the high threshold for initiating war and mobilizing for it. In the second stage, 
militaries increased their use of contractors to reduce their accountability to the citizenry and 
increase their freedom to deploy the forces as they chose (Avant & Sigelman, 2010).  
These are the variables critical for increasing or decreasing the level of legitimacy of using 
force. All work within the confines of the previously shaped political culture. Of course, they 
do not function simultaneously or at the same level of intensity.  
Furthermore, these variables all work within the limits of the public sphere of the state. In this 
realm various actors negotiate over the legitimacy of using force in the face of policymakers’ 
efforts to legitimize their actions. The polity is the crucial arena even if its domestic actors are 
influenced by external actors. For example, public opinion among European NATO members 
matters for decision-making in the U.S. However, decisions are initially made within the 
polity even if not autonomously. Only in extreme cases are policies externally coerced, as was 
the case with the NATO airstrikes that led to Yugoslavia’s withdrawal from Kosovo in 1999. 
Based on those initial decisions, states can negotiate among themselves to reach agreed-upon 
policies. Such process occurred when NATO members tried to reach consensus about their 
shared missions. In turn, consensus or debate impacts the polity of every member. Sometimes 
these effects lead to legitimacy-based policy changes, such as NATO members’ decisions to 
pull out troops from Afghanistan.    
More importantly, the variables may move in opposite directions. For example, the CIA-led 
drone warfare in Pakistan, mainly under President Obama, was successfully legitimized as a 
tool for removing an external threat. According to surveys, in 2013, 50% of Americans said 
that drones had made the U.S. safer, while only 14% said the opposite (Pew, 2013). At the 
same time, concerns about the legality of this warfare and the high number of Pakistani 
noncombatants killed were raised by the public and the Congress and prompted the 
administration to change policies (Crawford, 2013, 77, 121-122, 403-404). To balance these 
countervailing trends, the administration continued the warfare but modified its conduct. 
Thus, policymakers try to maneuver between conflicting legitimacy concerns as they read and 
interpret them.  
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Interrelationships between variables and components  
As noted previously, the dynamic variables work within the confines of the previously shaped 
political culture. However, there are interactions between the dynamic and static components 
of legitimacy. To offer a few illustrations:  
1. Expectations about legalizing the use of force rely on the norms that culturally shape 
political institutions (Owens, 2003b).  
2. States vary in their thresholds for tempering the requirement of noncombatant 
immunity. These levels depend on the extent to which this requirement is rooted in the 
political culture. For example, Britain’s culture prompted it to respect such immunity 
more so than American culture did. Therefore, Britain’s rules of engagement differed 
from those of the U.S. (Aylwin-Foster, 2005).  
3. As mentioned earlier, the Holocaust and the liberal heritage have shaped the 
perceptions of threats in Israel and the U.S., respectively.  The political culture, which 
largely inspires the strategic culture, provides a repertoire of symbols that establishes 
strategic preferences by formulating concepts about the nature of the adversary and the 
threat it poses (Johnston, 1996, 222-223). Surely, a repertoire of symbols used to 
dehumanize the enemy is inspired by that culture.  
4. In general, the level of militarization of society will determine the barriers to protests 
that challenge:  (a) military policies, and hence limit deliberation regardless of the 
model of recruitment; (b) the human costs of war and thus, the extent to which 
casualty sensitivity increases and may be balanced out by legitimizing the shifting of 
risk from one’s own soldiers to enemy noncombatants; (c) military policies from 
within the ranks, again, regardless of the model of recruitment.  
It follows that the infrastructure created by the constant component determines the extent to 
which policymakers can effectively use the dynamic component to increase the level of 
legitimacy. In turn, and this is only one example of such a combination, a high degree of 
legitimacy that leads to military failures or overly costly deployments slowly affects the 
constant component, which may lead to demilitarization.       
The dynamic variables are mutually interrelated. For example:  
1. While respecting the distinction between combatants and noncombatants is a 
general obligation (a domestic liberal constraint), its implementation may be 
affected by the image of enemy noncombatants more as “enemies” than 
“noncombatants” (the variables of the threat and dehumanization).  
2. Legitimation by technology helps relax accountability in cases of accidents and 
also increases the trust in the ability of the troops to accomplish their mission (part 
of the variable of the threat and its removal).  
3. The social, and hence also, the political makeup of the ranks impact the variable of 
deliberation by affecting the cycles and power of the citizens with an interest in the 
military deployment. At the same time, the greater the level of deliberation, the 
higher the threshold to legitimize the use of force in the face of internal opponents, 
thus affecting the variables of domestic constraints, the leveraging of technology 
and even the need to inflate the threat and promote dehumanization.  
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4. The dehumanization of the enemy may be twinned with the relaxation of 
responsibility inasmuch as the demand to relax noncombatant immunity is justified 
by the attempt to impose accountability on the civilians of the targeted entity for 
their leadership’s policies.  
To operationalize the legitimacy of using force, a high degree of the legitimacy occurs under 
the following conditions:  1) Policymakers believe that public opinion unequivocally supports 
the use of force to counter a significant threat.  Such support reflects embedded beliefs and is 
therefore expected to endure typical challenges arising during military campaigns such as 
failed incidents. Often, support is reinforced or signaled by elections, especially those held 
during a war or the preparation for war. 2) There are no effective antiwar movements (or 
conversely, groups are even organized to voice support for the use of force). 3) Manageable 
global restraints and the state’s limited obligations to enemy noncombatants allow freedom of 
action. 4) The troops unequivocally and faithfully adhere to the mission.  
In contrast, the lowest level of this legitimacy is evident when the same conditions move in 
the opposite direction, especially when there are effective antiwar protests that translate the 
passive disapproval of public opinion into active collective action and such protests diffuse 
into the ranks. Indeed, even policymakers’ expectations that such phenomena may occur will 
restrain their decisions about using force. A moderate level of legitimacy is expressed in 
mixed situations. A possible situation is when public opinion opposes military deployment 
but this objection is not translated into collective antiwar action and dissidence within the 
troops. In such a case, the policymakers have more freedom of action. This operationalization 
takes a substitutive (effect) rather than a constitutive (cause) approach (Gilley, 2006, 503-
504).   
 
Summary 
My point of departure was the need to conceptualize the legitimacy of using force within the 
polity, which is the space where initial decisions are made, rather than within the broader 
international community. To fill some of the gaps in the scholarly literature, I proposed a 
definition of this legitimacy and analyzed its components. I then integrated the constant, 
embedded level of legitimacy and the dynamic component, composed of variables that leaders 
can use to increase the level of legitimacy. 
Here we can see why legitimacy is not synonymous with public opinion. First, it is a 
multilayered concept, reflected in multiple arenas simultaneously. Second, it is one thing to 
convince the public rhetorically about the rightness of using force and another to do this by 
using methods that limit deliberation. Therefore, the multiple variables increasing legitimacy 
are worth studying.  
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